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A symposium on public utility regulation in Maine 
The regulation of public utilities in Maine continues to evolve in response to changing economic, 
political and social forces. Not only has the structure of regulation of the electrical and 
telecommunications industry seen dramatic changes in the past twenty years, but it also is certain 
the next decade will see equally fundamental changes. Maine Policy Review invited three key 
participants in Maine's regulatory arena - Robert Briggs of Bangor Hydro-Electric, Public 
Advocate Steve Ward, and Thomas McBrierty of New England Telephone - each to interpret the 
changes of the past two decades and what future changes we can expect. - Editor 
The changing role of regulation in the telecommunications industry 
by Thomas D. McBrierty, Vice President - Maine, New England Telephone 
In just two decades the telecommunications industry has undergone profound technological and 
market-place changes that are shaping our information based, global economy. In twenty years, 
the industry has gone from rotary black phones to personal computers, modems, and fax 
machines; from copper cables to fiber optics; from electro-mechanical switches to computer 
switches; from a single dominant company to an ever-more competitive marketplace. 
While the industry has changed dramatically, federal and state regulators - including those here 
in the state of Maine - have not stood still. On the other hand, the pace of regulatory change has 
not been as fast as the technological and marketplace changes. Nevertheless, there is a growing 
recognition that the underpinnings of traditional rate of return regulation no longer apply in 
today's relentlessly changing industry and in the competitive, global economy in which we all 
operate. 
What were those assumptions of traditional rate of return regulation? 
1. the desire for universal telephone service at reasonable rates;  
2. the belief that universality required use of internal subsidies (long distance subsidizing 
local basic exchange service and business rates generally subsidizing residence rates); 
and 
3. the belief that a unified Bell System could pursue these arrangements. 
Universal service achieved 
Traditional rate of return regulation worked well, so well in fact, that the goal of universal 
service has been virtually achieved. Today in Maine, about 95 percent of households have 
telephone service. 
As Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Sikes (1990a) puts it: "Past policies 
have served us well. The unified Bell System, cross-subsidies, rate of return regulation, and the 
like helped produce the world's leading telecommunications network. Those same policies, 
however, are in some ways as obsolete as yesterday's black rotary phone." 
Why do Chairman Sikes and a growing number of regulators and policymakers reach this 
conclusion? Isn't universal service as important today as it was twenty or twenty-five years ago? 
The answer is yes, absolutely. However, society is changing its assumption of how best to assure 
that those truly in need can still obtain basic exchange service. Instead of price subsidies, we 
have established federal and state programs for certified low-income individuals. For example, in 
Maine, New England Telephone, working closely with the Maine Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC), has expanded its Lifeline promotion program for discounted basic service as part of an 
interim, incentive-regulation agreement that replaces traditional rate-of-return regulation with 
some incentives and flexibilities. 
National policy needed 
Other countries have a well-defined, national telecommunications policy. However, we in the 
United States have yet to develop a clear vision. "A firm national consensus favoring the 
establishment of an advanced, feature-rich network of the future does not now exist," Sikes 
(1990b) notes. 
Many regulators question who should pay for what they see as a "gold-plated" network that 
would benefit only heavy users of data. The operating phone companies like New England 
Telephone must meet this concern head-on if our individual states and the nation as a whole are 
to remain globally competitive. 
The arguments against network modernization sound very much like those made by skeptics of 
the telephone itself. Some wondered aloud what anyone would do with Alexander Graham Bell's 
invention. FCC Commissioner Andrew Barrett (1991) cautions his fellow regulators: 
"We shouldn't presume, as may regulators are fond of doing, that most residential customers will 
only want plain old telephone services in the future. We simply don't know that until those 
residential customers have been offered something more." 
Arguments against network modernization also ignore the very real benefits to the general public 
of applications involving distance learning, telecommuting, health monitoring, services for the 
disabled, home shopping, banking, and money management. These types of services could 
reduce traffic congestion, pollution and unnecessary private and public costs. 
Telecommunications 'have and have-nots' 
Business customers already are looking for more advanced services, and most troubling, the 
larger ones have the means to develop their own communications systems. In 1987, U.S. 
companies spent $14.7 billion on private networks, and will spend 14 times that amount between 
1988 and 1993, according to George Gilder (1991), a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute. In 
the U.S., he estimates there are now 700,000 private net-works, compared to just 14,000 in all of 
Europe. Several Maine companies in recent years also have begun building private networks. 
The prospect of large users by-passing the public switched network could leave small businesses 
and residential customers footing the bill for a second-class communications system. The critical 
question becomes whether the public switched network will develop in a way that allows the 
general public to participate in the benefits of the "Information Age" or whether those benefits 
will be available only to those who can afford to interconnect with specialized private networks. 
This prospect is particularly troubling to a rural, geographically remote state like Maine, where 
small business plays a significant role in the economy. 
A "have" and "have-not" patch-work of private and public networks also bodes ill for the 
competitiveness of our nation. The Japanese strategy targets fiber optics and opto-electronics as 
the foundation of its economy in the next century. According to Gilder (1991), the Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry projects that by 2020, its fiber network will generate 
no less than one third of Japan's entire gross national product. 
Clearly, other countries are betting that in the twenty-first century the telecommunications 
infrastructure will be even more crucial than it is today. New England Telephone has become 
increasingly aware of the role that we must play in the development of a world-class 
telecommunications infrastructure. We have aggressively automated and redesigned our 
operating systems, begun deploying Signaling System 7 that makes it possible to offer new 
services, replaced analog switches with digital switches, and increased deployment of fiber-optic 
cable, broadband services, and network intelligence. 
But we and the other regional companies are still hamstrung by the lack of a clear national policy 
and by regulations that impede rather than advance the vision of an information-rich network. 
While some regulatory progress - both at the federal and state levels - has been made, it has been 
mostly piecemeal. However, on the positive side, some states have served as "laboratories" for 
various types of regulatory refinements. 
Maine stipulation 
Maine is among more than forty states that have examined or approved alternative forms of 
regulation in recent years. In June 1989, the Maine Public Utilities Commission approved a 
stipulation reached by NET and several interveners, including business and consumer groups and 
the Public Advocate's Office. Hopefully, the agreement is an interim step towards a more 
permanent form of incentive regulation. 
The stipulation provides earnings incentives and flexibility in the pricing and marketing of new 
services. In return, NET agreed to reduce residence and business toll rates by $8 million per year. 
We also spent $100,000 to increase public awareness of the Maine Lifeline Program, which 
provides a seven-dollar credit for basic service for customers certified as eligible. NET 
committed to investing up to an additional $10 million over-and-above its normal network 
modernization program for specific new technologies such as Signaling System 7, a network 
platform for information-age services. 
The stipulation provided the company with the freedom to conduct one-year promotional trials 
for existing services and market trials for new ones. NET also was free to offer special contracts 
as market conditions warrant. Over the two-year period of the initial agreement, NET tested or 
introduced an unprecedented fourteen new services. Two of the new services trialed were 
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Phonesmart (sm) call management services. 
ISDN is a technology that allows for the simultaneous transmission of voice and data over a 
single telephone line. 
As part of the Stipulation, the company also began listening more closely to its customers 
through quarterly meetings with a panel of large business customers and another panel of small 
business and residence customers. We also began holding a series of half-day 
telecommunications seminars to educate small business customers about telecommunications 
services. 
In June 1990, NET filed comments with the Maine PUC as part of a docket on incentive 
regulation for telecommunications utilities. In June 1991, the commission extended the current 
stipulation for a year. Under the extended agreement, the commission and its staff are working 
on a process to initiate rulemaking on incentive regulation. 
Various forms of regulatory reform are steps in the right direction. NET looks forward to 
working with the commission scarf and interveners in moving further along the spectrum of 
incentive regulation. 
Alternatives to rate-of-return regulation 
Alternatives to rate-of-return regulation are being tried or studied in almost every state. 
Alternatives can be considered under four broad categories: (1) service by service flexibility; (2) 
sharing, a range of earnings or a combination of the two; (3) contracts; and (4) price regulation. 
Service by service flexibility 
This methodology allows competitive and enhanced services to be offered under greater 
marketing and earnings flexibility than so-called monopoly services. The Maine PUC has used 
this for Centrex Services and Quickway Digital Private Line Service. 
Sharing, a range of earnings, or combination of the two 
Under sharing provisions, a regulated company "shares" earnings in excess of some specified 
level with customers. Under a range of earnings, the company's allowed rate of return is 
permitted to fluctuate within some range. Either procedure provides some incentives for 
regulated firms to improve performance. The commission used this approach in authorizing a 
range of return on intrastate investment in 1987. It does present incentives; however, the earnings 
incentive usually is in effect for a very short period of time, thereby limiting the ability of the 
incentives to generate systematic, strategic change. 
Contract 
A contract approach, which is sometimes called a "social contract," usually involves the 
negotiation of various new responsibilities and new incentives for regulated utilities. The Maine 
Stipulation, which was previously described, is an example. 
Price regulation 
This method of regulation places a ceiling on prices by using a formula that reflects changes in 
the cost of providing the services. The formula automatically adjusts for forces like inflation. The 
regulated firm under price regulation faces a fixed regulatory formula over an extended period 
and hence confronts a long-term set of incentives to improve performance. 
Strategic versus tactical role 
Whatever form or combination of models is adopted, the overall goal should be a framework that 
allows a direct focus on customers. Too often, utilities spend too much time concentrating on 
regulators, rather than on customers. No doubt, at times regulators also must feel that their 
resources are diverted away from greater attention to broader public goals. 
The form of incentive regulation should allow the commission to adopt an effective, strategic 
role in place of a time-consuming, inefficient, tactical one. Regulators should be able to 
effectively penalize and reward performance based on available opportunities. Marketing efforts, 
critical to the current and future prospects for the state's economy, should be effectively 
rewarded. Prices, service quality, new services, and company returns all should be evaluated in a 
balanced fashion to establish that the company has an opportunity to earn a fair, but not 
necessarily fixed, return. 
States can lead the way 
Incentive regulation better redefines the changing roles of both regulators and the regulated 
firms. States like Maine have served as valuable laboratories for testing new forms of incentive 
regulation like the stipulation. The states can help lead the way to building a national 
telecommunications strategy based on a shared vision of a truly world-class infrastructure. More 
fundamentally, neither state nor federal regulators alone can achieve a comprehensive policy. 
Continued progress is needed on both levels. 
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